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We present experimental evidence on the existence of disadvantageous lies. Literature 
so far assumes that people do not lie to their monetary disadvantage. However, some people 
have preferences for appearing honest. If the utility gained from appearing honest outweighs 
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1.  Introduction 
“You shall not bear false witness against  your  neighbor.”  (Exodus,  20:  16)  Indeed, 
many experimental studies have shown that a significant share of people are lying averse.
1 
Nevertheless  people  also  lie.  There  are  various  reasons  why  people  do  so.  The  most 
prominent one is for material advantage. For example, somebody who evades taxes tries to 
increase income. Another reason is to manipulate others’ perceptions or opinions. This type of 
lie should convey the belief that the person who lies has favorable traits. For example people 
exaggerate their athletic achievements or number of girlfriends in order to impress others. 
Sometimes these potential motives for a lie are in conflict. Thus, people will tell a lie that 
actually reduces their financial wellbeing if the utility gained from a manipulation of another 
person’s belief outweighs the material payoff gained from a lie to one’s monetary benefit or 
the truth. 
In Balzac’s oeuvre Splendeurs et misères des courtisanes, the main character lies to his 
own detriment. In this novel, Lucien de Rubenplé cheats in a card game, in order to counter 
his father-in-law’s (justifiable) mistrust. The protagonist lies in order to appear honest. There 
are also other reasons why people might lie to their monetary disadvantage. For example, a 
hungry person will not admit to being hungry if it is more important to her to not appear 
greedy. 
However, disadvantageous lies are difficult to detect - especially in environments where 
we  cannot  directly  measure  lying  since  the  event  of  lying  is  private  information  to  the 
potential liar. Nevertheless, in this paper we present evidence for disadvantageous lying. We 
measure the distribution of lying behavior with the experimental design of Fischbacher and 
Heusi (2008). In this game participants privately roll a six-sided die. Payoffs depend on  what 
subjects report to be the outcome of the roll. The payoff equals the reported outcome in euros, 
except for a reported die roll of 6, in which case the payoff equals 0. There are several studies 
applying this particular design
2 and also some studies adapting the design to a more simple 
mechanism.
3 There are at least two possible predictions. If all subjects honestly report their 
outcome, the reported outcomes will follow an equal distribution. If all subjects are payoff 
maximizing, they will report the number with the highest payoff possible. 
Generally,  there  are  three  very  robust  findings:  First,  the  outcome  with  the  highest 
                                                 
1 See for example Gneezy (2005), Cai and Wang (2006), Sutter (2009), Rode (2010), Charness and Dufwenberg 
(2006), Lundquist et al. (2009), Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007), Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2009), Kartik 
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possible  payoff  (5  in  the  experiment)  is  significantly  higher  than  one  sixth.  Second,  the 
frequency of reports of the second highest payoff is also significantly higher than one sixth. 
This means people cheat, but not all of them do so to the maximum extent. This incomplete 
cheating  can  for  example  be  explained  by  Akerlof  (1983)  who  states  that  people  prefer 
appearing  honest  to  actually  being  honest.  He a r g u e s  t h a t  t h i s  b e havior  stems  from  the 
substantial long-run economic returns available to those who develop a reputation of integrity. 
In a laboratory experiment Hao and Houser (2011) show that incomplete cheating can be 
attributed to an aversion to appearing dishonest rather than an aversion to maximum cheating. 
The third basic finding is that there is a positive number of people who report the minimum 
outcome. So far, the literature commonly assumes that people will not lie to their monetary 
disadvantage and defines those minimum reporters as honest.
 4  
We conducted the experiment with nuns and our findings show a completely different 
pattern. In particular, our subjects do not overreport but underreport high outcomes. Thus, the 
data rejects the assumption of people not lying to their monetary disadvantage. This shows the 
existence of disadvantageous lies. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  next  section  we  present  the 
experimental design and procedure, section 3 describes the results, and section 4 concludes. 
2.  Experimental Design and Procedure 
For the experiment we use the lying game by Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). In this 
game every participant privately rolls a die. The payoff equals the corresponding number of 
the die in euros, but equals 0 if the die shows a 6. Participants were explicitly told to roll the 
die more than once in order to check whether the die was fair, but the first roll was the 
relevant one. 
die  1  2  3  4  5  6 
payoff  1  2  3  4  5  0 
Table: The game 
We conducted the experiment with students and nuns. All participants were female. The 
students’ session was conducted with a total number of 19 participants in May 2010. The 
nuns’  session  was  conducted  with  12  participants  in  March  2011.  Each  subject  sat  at  a 
randomly assigned individual desk, such that her actions could not be observed by others, and 
was  given  an  envelope.  The  envelope  contained  the  instructions  of  the  pen-and-paper 
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experiment, a die, a pen, a key, and a smaller envelope. After having written down their 
outcome on the instructions, participants were asked to put the instructions into the smaller 
envelope and drop the envelope into a provided urn. We implemented the payout procedure in 
the following way: Every copy of instructions was marked with the same number as a unique 
key.  The  key  belonged  to  a  mailbox  stand  whose  boxes  were  also  numbered.  For  every 
number we calculated the payoff and filled the corresponding mailbox with the respective 
payoff. After all the mailboxes were filled, participants could one by one – and without being 
observed by the experimenter - open their box, take out their envelope, leave their key in the 
box, and lock the mailbox. After every participant had picked up their payoff, we opened the 
mailboxes  with  an  extra  key.  By  this  means  we  could  guarantee  a  strictly  anonymous 
procedure.  
3.  Results and Discussion 
If subjects reported truthfully, reported numbers should follow an equal distribution. 
Every number should be reported with probability 1/6. As Figure shows, students’ reports do 
not  follow  an  equal  distribution.  (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
5,  p<0.001).  Nor  are  the  nuns’ 
decisions equally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p<0.02).  
 
Figure: Frequency of payoffs of nuns and students 
Students report 3.84 on average which shifts the distribution to the right. Nuns report 
1.67. The nuns’ distribution is thus shifted to the left. A Wilcoxon ranksum test confirms that 
students report significantly higher numbers than nuns (p<0.001). Our results show that both 
students  and  nuns  lie.  However, m o t i v a t i o n  a n d  i m p a c t  a r e  different.  By  lying,  students 
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increase their profits, while nuns decrease their profits. So far the literature assumes that 
people  do  not  cheat  to  obtain  worse  outcomes.  However,  our  results  show  that 
disadvantageous lies do exist. 
One concern regarding the subject pool of nuns deserves discussion. One might object 
that incentives did not work correctly on the nuns. However, if incentives had not worked, 
reported  outcomes  would  have  been  equally  distributed.  If  subjects  do n o t  h a v e  i n c o m e -
maximizing preferences and no preferences for underreporting their outcome, they will just 
report their true outcome. But this is not what we see in the data. On the contrary, our subjects 
are  underreporting  their  outcome,  therefore  lying  to  their  disadvantage.  Apart  from  a 
preference to appear honest, another reason for this behavior might be a preference for not 
appearing  greedy.  These  two  preferences are, however, very difficult to disentangle. In a 
dictator game we find that nuns are in fact more generous and therefore less greedy than 
students. Nevertheless, this result cannot clarify which preference drives the nuns’ behavior. 
4.  Conclusion 
In this paper we present evidence that people are willing to lie with the very purpose of 
reducing their income. People will do so if the utility gained from a manipulation of another 
person’s belief (in our case: the experimenter) outweighs the material payoff gained from a lie 
to one’s monetary benefit or the truth. This concept has been ignored so far. Until now, the 
literature assumes that people will not lie to their monetary disadvantage. Previous studies 
might therefore have overestimated the fraction of honest people in experiments.  
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